Cognitive Load Increases Bias in Estimation
Memory is essential for guiding behavior, yet a large body of research suggests that memory exhibits systematic biases. One well-known bias is central tendency, where individuals remember stimuli as being more typical of the category of which they are members than they actually are (Hollingworth, 1911) . Once considered a perceptual or mnemonic distortion, this bias has been reinterpreted as resulting from an adaptive, Bayesian process that reconstructs inexact memories by combining them with prior knowledge about categories (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Vevea, 2001 ).
Individuals may have their cognitive resources strained when remembering. For example, someone recalling a grandchild's size may be distracted by conversation. In other disciplines, such competing demands have been studied under the rubric of cognitive load. Although cognitive load clearly affects complex decision-making, little work has examined how such cognitive constraints affect memory for basic sensory information. Here we examine the how cognitive load interacts with the central tendency bias in line length estimation.
Huttenlocher and colleagues (Crawford, Huttenlocher, & Engebretson 1999; Duffy, Huttenlocher, & Crawford, 2007; Duffy, Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Crawford, 2008) have explained this bias as resulting from an adaptive process that increases the net accuracy of stimulus estimation. In their category adjustment model (CAM), a category is represented as a distribution of stimulus values along some dimension, such as size or shape, and a stimulus as a fine-grain value along the relevant set of dimensions. Categories typically have lower and upper boundaries that represent the smallest or largest possible stimulus size (i.e., the smallest and tallest tree), with the center of the category being the most typical member. For most categories, this is the running average value of the category . Stimuli are encoded as a fine-grain memory along the relevant stimulus dimension with some degree of uncertainty (x is about 35 feet tall), and as a member of a category (x is a tree). Upon recall, information from both levels is combined in a Bayesian manner to create an estimate of the stimulus, with the category information serving as the prior distribution used to adjust for the inexactness of the fine-grain memory. The CAM proposed by Huttenlocher and colleagues in similar in spirit to the Bayesian models that have been used to explain biases in memory for size estimation (Ashourian and Lowenstien, 2011) , time perception (Jazayeri and Shadlen, 2010) and hue bias (Olkkonen and Allred, 2014) .
Because individuals have divergent experiences with trees and other natural categories, experimental studies in the laboratory explore the central tendency bias by having people inductively learn a new, artificial category of stimuli through a task employing serial reproduction. Most commonly, lines that vary in length are used. In a canonical version of the task, participants see a study line briefly. After a delay, participants adjust a test line to match the study line. Participants repeat this process with lines that differ in size. The statistical distribution of the study line lengths quickly begins to affect behavior. Participants show a central tendency bias in their test adjustments, overestimating shorter lines and underestimating longer lines.
Bayesian models of such central tendency biases in both line length estimation and other domains predicts that increasing uncertainty of the fine grain (sensory) information will lead to greater weighting of category (prior) information, thus leading to more pronounced bias toward the category prototype. In principle, numerous factors could increase stimulus uncertainty. One such factor is delay length. Work across a number of domains demonstrates that sensory representations become less precise, or more uncertain, over time (for review, see Magnusson and Greenlee 1999). Consistent with this, Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Duncan (1991) found in the spatial domain that memories of location showed more pronounced category bias after a long delay than a short one. Crawford, et al. (2000) showed that with estimates of line length, category bias increased when a delay was introduced, whereas bias due to perceptual factors (i.e., the Mueller-Llyer illusion) did not.
In a separate literature, research has examined the effect of cognitive load on decisionmaking. Cognitive load manipulations are secondary tasks a person engages in while simultaneously completing a task of interest. An extensive literature documents that cognitive resources are bounded and constrained, and that increasing cognitive load can compromise judgments (Cornelissen, Dewitte, and Warlop, 2011; Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999; Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990; Van den Bos, Peters, Bobocel, and Ybema, 2006) . Cognitive load increases anchoring effects (Bergman, Ellingsen, Johannesson, & Svensson, 2010; Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009) , limits the ability to process information (Gilbert, Pelham and Krull, 1988) , decreases self-control (Mann and Ward, 2007) , and decreases strategic behavior in game theory tasks such as the Prisoner's Dilemma (Duffy & Smith, 2014) . However, to our knowledge, no study has employed a cognitive load task to study the central tendency bias in estimation.
If cognitive load increases uncertainty in memory, then category (prior) information would gain more influence, resulting in more bias in estimates. Although cognitive load has not been shown to affect basic perceptual processing, an analogous set of findings in the social cognition literature indicates that prior expectations influence judgments more when people are under cognitive constraints. Spontaneous trait inferences are more affected by stereotypes when people were required to retain an 8 digit number during the task (Wigboldus, Sherman, Franzese, & van Knippenberg, 2004) . In addition, van Kippenberg, Dijksterhuis & Vermeulen (1999) showed that after reading about a crime, the availability of a negative stereotype affected punishment decisions, memory, and assessment of guilt when forced to read at a fast pace (high cognitive load), but not when reading at a comfortable pace.
We examine the effect of cognitive constraints on the degree to which category information influences stimulus estimates in two experiments. In the first, we manipulate the delay between the initial presentation of a stimulus and its estimation. This form of constraint is temporal: longer delays represent a greater constraint than shorter delays. Although this specific combination of task and constraint have not previously been examined, similar studies with in estimation with other tasks or stimulus domains lead to the strong prediction that increasing delay will increase the weight of category information. Second, we manipulate cognitive load by asking observers to remember a 2 digit (low load) or 6 digit (high load) number or letter string while they simultaneously estimate stimuli. If cognitive load functions like delay to increase the fine-grain information, then increasing cognitive load should also increase the effect of category information on stimulus estimates.
Experiment 1: Effect of delay

Methodology:
Participants: In this and the following study, undergraduates at Rutgers University (65 total, 40 females, 25 males) participated to fulfill a course requirement.
Design and Procedure:
We employed a computer-administered serial reproduction task in which participants reproduced lines that varied in length. On each trial, a horizontal study line was presented for 1 second. After either a short (4 seconds) or long (8 seconds) delay period, a test line appeared, and participants were instructed to adjust the test line with a mouse until it matched the length of the study stimulus. Participants pressed enter to indicate satisfaction with their match, and the next trial began. Participants were debriefed at the end of the session. Study lines varied in 16-pixel increments from 80-368 pixels and were 5 pixels wide. Participants viewed 10 study lines at each of the 19 lengths. Study stimuli were presented in random order.
The length of the test varied randomly. Delay was a between-participants variable, so each participants experienced either short or long delays.
Results
To analyze the data, we first calculated the estimation bias for each study stimulus by subtracting the actual length of the study line from the subject's response. Positive bias thus means that participants remembered lines as being longer than they actually were; negative bias means that participants remembered lines as being shorter than they actually were. The bias data averaged across observers is shown in Figure 1 . Consistent with previous results, participants overestimated the length of short lines, and underestimated the length of long lines.
To investigate the effect of delay on the central tendency bias, we performed a multiple regression analysis with dummy variables and compared the intercept and slopes of the two bias curves. We tested a two-level mixed effects model, with bias as the outcome variable. Fixed effects included actual length, a dummy variable for condition, the interaction between condition and actual length, the starting length of the response line, and the interaction between the starting length and condition. Participant intercepts and slopes were included as random effects. Table 1 provides a model comparison summary of the effects of sequentially adding fixed these effects to the model. 
Discussion
The main goal of Experiment 1 was to investigate the effect of delay on the strength of the central tendency bias. Increasing the delay increased the central tendency bias. This is consistent with a Bayesian framework in which stimulus estimates are produced by a combination of fine-grain information and category information. Increasing the delay increases the variability of the fine-grain representation, thus causing stimulus estimates to be more affected by the category (prior) information. Similar increases in bias with delay have also been reported for size (Ashourian and Lowenstein, 2011) and hue estimates (Olkkonen, McCarthy & Allred, in press ).
Less predictably, the starting length of the reproduction line also influenced responses.
This can be termed an anchoring effect. Such effects have not previously been examined in the context of the category adjustment model literature. Most prior studies used a fixed starting length that has a single value throughout the entire experiment. This anchoring effect was larger with longer delays. This may be due to the fact that the memory of the original stimulus degraded so much that the starting length of the reproduction line gets assimilated with the memory of the original target line. Alternatively, people may stop adjusting earlier under condition of greater delay.
Experiments 2: Cognitive Load Number and Letter Tasks
Methodology
Participants:
Thirty-five people (20 females, 15 males) participated in the number task, and thirty three people (22 females, 11 males) participated the letter task. We discarded participants who failed to complete the task (1 participants, letter task) or who achieved less than 50% correct in the high load condition (2 participants, letter task)
Design and Procedure:
The estimation task was very similar to Experiment 1, with the following minor adjustments. First, before the onset of the study line, participants viewed a 2-digit (low cognitive load) or 6-digit (high cognitive load) number or letter that they were instructed to remember.
The study stimulus was presented for 1.5 seconds (instead of 1 second), and the delay between study and test was always 1.5 seconds (instead of 4 or 8 seconds). After participants indicated satisfaction with their match, they were prompted to type in the 2-or 6-digit number or letter.
To create number strings, we used integers. To create letter strings, we drew from the set BCFJKLPQSX. This letter choice prevented English-speakers from grouping letters into words.
We used both tasks because numbers might be easier to "chunk" than letters.
To increase statistical power, cognitive load was a within-participants variable. In order to constrain the length of the experimental session to a reasonable time, we decreased the number of study lines tested from 19 to 9. Thus, study lines ranged from 96 to 352 pixels in 32 pixel increments. Participants saw each study line 10 times, 5 in the low-load condition, and 5 in the high-load condition. The pattern of results in the number and letter tasks identical, with the single exception that in the letter task there was a significant main effect of condition on length, indicating that observers overestimate more when under high cognitive load. This effect is small, however, and it affects only the intercept (and not the slope) of the bias line. It is also small compared to the other reported effects of central tendency bias and the effect of cognitive load on the size of the bias.
Discussion
In Experiment 2 we again replicated the central tendency bias. In addition, we found that high cognitive load, as operationalized by remembering 6 digit strings of numbers or letters, functions much like increasing delay: both increase the strength of the central tendency bias.
Overall, we also observed the anchoring effect, although unlike the anchoring effect in Experiment 1, there was no interaction with load.
General Discussion
In two Experiments, we have demonstrated that both delay and cognitive load affect how people estimate stimuli. Increasing the delay and adding cognitive load increased the central tendency bias. Thus, category-level information influenced stimulus estimates more when memory or cognitive demands increased.
Although a number of studies have found that manipulating memory demands influences stimulus estimates (see Greenlee and Magnusson, 1999 for review), this study is to our knowledge the first to study this class of estimation biases under conditions of variable delay and cognitive load. The finding that category information affects estimates more under higher cognitive load suggests that, like increased delay, cognitive load interferes with the fine grain representation of the stimulus. In addition, this result suggests that activating and applying category information in the context of this task may be a relatively automatic process, as it does not appear to be compromised by the cognitive load manipulations used here. Because strong conclusions about automaticity cannot be made based only on these experiments, we suggest this as a topic for further research.
These findings are also the first to show that the starting length of the reproduction line influences estimates. Prior studies used a constant starting length of the reproduction line , Crawford, Huttenlocher, & Engebretson, 2000 or randomized it without analyzing its effects . Here we find a significant anchoring effect in that estimates were biased toward the starting value of the response line, suggesting that people did not adjust it quite far enough. But unlike the central tendency bias, this effect did not increase with load.
Psychologists and economists are increasingly interested in how social conditions, such as poverty, put people under conditions of cognitive constraint that may affect decision making.
Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir and Zhao (2014) compared poor and wealthy Americans on the tasks measuring fluid intelligence and cognitive control. They found that wealth did not affect performance on easy problems, but that poor Americans performed worse on hard problems. The effects of cognitive constraint are not only found between-observers: poor rural sugarcane farmers in India perform worse on similar cognitive tests before harvest (when they are worried about money) than they do after harvest (when they have just been paid). Biological markers were not indicative of physical stress; rather, poverty introduces high cognitive load. Thus, one direction for future research is to examine the effect of exogenous factors such as poverty or culture influence how people rely upon prior knowledge in estimation (Duffy & Kitayama, 2007) .
The finding that participants use category information more under conditions of high cognitive load has implications for eyewitness testimony.. Witnesses to a crime are likely under cognitive load due during interrogation due to the cognitive and emotional stress they endure (Christiansen, 1992) ; category (or prior) information may thus have a greater effect on their memories. Accurate eyewitness testimony is critical for correctly identifying perpetrators.
However, if witnesses rely more on categories under these conditions of cognitive constraint, they may be more likely to report seeing a category prototype (e.g. this is what typical column 1) ; the total number of parameters is reflected in the second column (df). Parameters were either fixed (F) or random (R ). Column 4 shows the ratio of the log-likelihoods of the fit provided by the two models listed in the fourth column. P represents the significance of the model calculated using AIC (Akaike, 1974) . Briefly, it indicates whether the improvement of the model fit justifies the inclusion of the extra parameter. 
